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New Jersey Search-and-Seizure Law:  
A Recent Perspective 
Peter G. Verniero∗
My task is to provide an overview of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s search-and-seizure law established over the past five years.  I 
will endeavor to fulfill that mission by highlighting the substantive 
holdings of previous decisions, many of which you undoubtedly are 
aware.  Beyond delivering a listing of those holdings, I hope to 
provide some common themes running through our recent case law.  
That latter objective is a challenge because, by design, search-and-
seizure jurisprudence turns on highly specific circumstances.  A 
variation of a single fact can lead to opposite results in cases involving 
otherwise identical fact patterns.1  From that perspective, it 
sometimes is difficult to discern a unifying principle among 
seemingly similar cases. 
But that itself becomes a unifying tenet of sorts, namely, that the 
law in this area generally is not captive to per se rules but rather takes 
on contour and shape depending on the facts at issue.  The court 
made that point explicitly in State v. Cooke.2  After discussing the 
factors that supported a finding of exigency in the context of a 
warrantless automobile search, the court stated that any one of those 
factors would have been insufficient to justify the search.3  The court 
also stated that “the term ‘exigent circumstances’ is, by design, 
inexact.  It is incapable of precise definition because, by its nature, 
the term takes on form and shape depending on the facts of any 
given case.”4
 ∗ Of Counsel, Sills Cummis Epstein & Gross P.C.; Associate Justice of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, 1999–2004; New Jersey Attorney General, 1996–1999; J.D., 
Duke University, 1984; B.A., Drew University, 1981.  This Article is adapted from a 
speech given at Seton Hall University School of Law in November 2004. 
 1 See infra notes 25–48 and accompanying text. 
 2 163 N.J. 657, 751 A.2d 52 (2000). 
 3 Id. at 675, 751 A.2d at 102. 
 4 Id. at 676, 751 A.2d at 102. 
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The court again displayed its distaste for per se rules in State v. 
Wilson.5  In that case, the court held that the State had insufficient 
probable cause to conduct a search of a vehicle in which the 
defendant was a passenger, based on the officer’s testimony at the 
suppression hearing.6  Although it affirmed the Appellate Division, 
which had reached the same conclusion, the court stated that it was 
not approving a hypothetical statement contained in the lower 
court’s opinion that suggested a per se rule for future cases.7  The 
court stated: “In avoiding bright-line pronouncements in this area of 
law, we continue to believe that ‘courts must consider the totality of 
the circumstances, without focusing exclusively on any one factor, in 
considering whether probable cause has been established.’”8
Despite the seemingly idiosyncratic nature of our jurisprudence, 
the overarching inquiry in most search-and-seizure cases is 
reasonableness.  At times the inquiry is unstated.  But it usually boils 
down to a single question: Did the police act in an objectively 
reasonable fashion?  That question flows directly from the text of the 
Fourth Amendment9 and the analogous Article I, paragraph 7 of the 
New Jersey Constitution.10  To some extent reasonableness is like 
pornography—you know it when you see it.11  To assist courts in the 
reasonableness inquiry and presumably to foster a consistent 
approach, the United States Supreme Court and my former court 
have articulated standards or suggested frameworks to guide trial 
courts. 
 5 178 N.J. 7, 833 A.2d 1087 (2003). 
 6 Id. at 15, 833 A.2d at 1091. 
 7 Id. at 18, 833 A.2d at 1091. 
 8 Id. (citing State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 216, 777 A.2d 60, 67 (2001); State v. 
Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 362, 823 A.2d 38, 49 (2003)). 
 9 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 10 Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the papers and things to be seized. 
N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 7. 
 11 See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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As an example, in State v. Ravotto,12 my former court adopted for 
use under Article I, paragraph 7 the same balancing test espoused by 
the United States Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor13 to determine 
whether the exercise of force by police is reasonable.  The test 
“requires careful attention to the facts and circumstance of each 
particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether 
the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to 
evade arrest by flight.”14  Ravotto is not a lone example.  Over the past 
five years the court has articulated standards or multi-part tests in 
numerous other settings.15
Another basic principle confirmed within the past five years is 
that the party bearing the burden of proof in a suppression motion 
(for example, the State in cases of warrantless searches) must 
establish an adequate record to justify the conduct or position at 
issue.  State v. Wilson made that point expressly.16  Although the court 
has demonstrated a willingness to infer facts from the record or take 
judicial notice of facts when appropriate, as it did in State v. Nishina,17 
Wilson is a good example of the limits of such willingness. 
In Wilson, the State argued on appeal that the quantity of illegal 
drugs found on the defendant’s person provided sufficient probable 
cause to believe that the automobile in which the defendant had 
been a passenger contained additional drugs, justifying a warrantless 
search of the car.18  The problem with that argument, as the court saw 
 12 169 N.J. 227, 235–36, 777 A.2d 301, 306 (2001). 
 13 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
 14 Ravotto, 169 N.J. at 236, 777 A.2d at 306–07 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). 
 15 State v. Johnson, 168 N.J. 608, 619, 775 A.2d 1273, 1279–80 (2001) 
(establishing a three-part framework within which to evaluate no-knock search 
warrants); State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 360–61, 823 A.2d 38, 48 (2003) 
(establishing a three-part test for evaluating the independent-source doctrine); Joye 
v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 176 N.J. 568, 597, 826 A.2d 624, 
642 (2003) (adopting for use under the New Jersey Constitution the federal special-
needs test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), when evaluating random drug and alcohol 
testing of high school students); State v. Cassidy, 179 N.J. 150, 161, 843 A.2d 1132, 
1138 (2004) (confirming that three requirements are necessary to sustain police 
conduct under the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement). 
 16 State v. Wilson, 178 N.J. 7, 17, 833 A.2d 1087, 1093 (2003). 
 17 175 N.J. 502, 507, 816 A.2d 153, 156 (2003) (inferring from the record that the 
defendant was at least seventeen years of age because he was a licensed driver, and 
taking judicial notice of the fact that the school in question was a lower elementary 
school). 
 18 Wilson, 178 N.J. at 17, 833 A.2d at 1093. 
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it, was that the State submitted insufficient evidence to support it at 
the suppression hearing.19  The court explained that, “[a]lthough we 
can infer or take judicial notice of certain facts in appropriate 
circumstances, we cannot fill in gaps in the record to supply the 
requisite proofs required of the State under constitutional 
standards.”20
The State also included in its appellate argument an alternative 
theory for admitting the evidence, namely, on the basis of a search 
incident to a lawful arrest.21  The problem with that argument was 
that the State did not seek certification on that theory of the case.22  
Thus, the court declined to rule on it.23  Accordingly, in addition to 
its substantive holding, Wilson stands for the proposition that the 
court will decline to rule on alternate contentions raised by a party 
on appeal if the argument or contention was not first contained in 
the petition for certification.24
Perhaps no two cases better illustrate the fact-sensitive nature of 
my former court’s search-and-seizure jurisprudence than two cases 
decided at the end of the 2003-2004 term, State v. Pineiro25 and State v. 
Moore.26  In Pineiro, a police officer was on patrol in a so-called “high 
crime area” when he observed the defendant and a co-defendant 
standing on a street corner.27  The officer testified that he recognized 
both individuals and had received unspecified intelligence reports 
indicating that the defendant was a suspected drug dealer.28  The 
officer knew the co-defendant because he had arrested him for child 
support and possible possession of a controlled dangerous substance 
and was aware that he was also a drug user.29
The officer observed the defendant give the co-defendant a pack 
of cigarettes, but saw no money exchanged.30  The two men appeared 
shocked and surprised in noticing the officer immediately after the 
transfer.31  Turning to leave the area, the defendant started to walk 
 19 Id. at 15, 833 A.2d at 1091. 
 20 Id. at 17, 833 A.2d at 1093 (internal citation omitted). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Wilson, 178 N.J. at 17–18, 833 A.2d at 1093. 
 25 181 N.J. 13, 853 A.2d 887 (2004). 
 26 181 N.J. 40, 853 A.2d 903 (2004). 
 27 Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 18, 853 A.2d at 890. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
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down the street while the co-defendant mounted a nearby bicycle.32  
The officer detained the co-defendant, informing him that the officer 
believed that the co-defendant had just purchased drugs.33  The man 
began to cry, denying any drug involvement.34  The officer retrieved 
the cigarette pack, finding heroin inside.35  Other officers stopped 
and arrested the defendant.36
On those facts, the court held that the totality of circumstances 
justified an investigatory detention of both men.37  In so doing, the 
court confirmed the applicable standard that a proper investigatory 
detention “is based on specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”38
The court next considered whether those same facts supported 
probable cause to search the co-defendant and seize the cigarette 
pack found on his person.39  The court concluded that the facts were 
insufficient for that purpose.40  While confirming that probable cause 
equated with “a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is 
being committed,”41 the court held that the government’s proofs fell 
short of that standard.42  Pineiro is a good example of the sometimes 
subtle distinction between the reasonable suspicion standard and 
probable cause. 
In Moore, decided the same day as Pineiro, a twelve-year veteran 
police officer was working undercover in an area described as a high 
crime area.43  He observed a group of six people in a vacant lot and 
observed an individual, later identified as the defendant, and his 
companion hand currency to a third man, each receiving from that 
man a small item in return.44  The court upheld the subsequent 
search and seizure of the defendant, explaining that the officer 
 32 Id. 
 33 Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 18, 853 A.2d at 890. 
 34 Id. at 19. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 25, 853 A.2d at 894 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 38 Id. at 20, 853 A.2d at 891. 
 39 Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 27, 853 A.2d at 896. 
 40 Id. at 29, 853 A.2d at 896. 
 41 Id. at 21, 853 A.2d at 892 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. 
Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 816 A.2d 153, 161 (2003)). 
 42 Id. at 28, 853 A.2d at 896. 
 43 State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40, 43, 853 A.2d 903, 905 (2004). 
 44 Id. 
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was an experienced narcotics officer.  He previously had made 
numerous drug arrests in the same neighborhood, which was 
known to the police for heavy drug trafficking.  Using binoculars, 
he observed three men move away from the group to the back of 
a vacant lot, and he saw [the] defendant and his companion give 
money to the third person in exchange for small unknown 
objects.  Based on his experience and those factors, it was 
reasonable for [the officer] to conclude that the totality of the 
circumstances supported a well-grounded suspicion that he had 
witnessed a drug transaction.45
In comparing the two cases and the opposite results, it is 
apparent that the exchange of currency was a critical distinction.  
The court in Pineiro made that point explicitly, stating that “unlike in 
Moore, there was no observation of currency or anything else 
exchanged, rather, there was merely a transfer of a cigarette pack 
under circumstances that had both innocent and suspected criminal 
connotations.”46
The Pineiro court also noted that “there was no proof of 
‘regularized police experience that objects such as [hard cigarette 
packs] are the probable containers of drugs.’”47  Moreover, the court 
stated that: “The evidence did not even include the number of times 
the officer had encountered the use of cigarette packs to exchange 
drugs or what percentage of observed cigarette packs held drugs.”48
Another example of how two seemingly similar cases might lead 
to opposite results can be found by comparing State v. Rodriguez49 with 
State v. Golotta.50  In Rodriguez, the police received an anonymous 
informant’s tip that the defendant and his companion would be 
engaged in drug trafficking.51  The tipster described the physical 
appearance of both men, noting that they would be traveling by bus.52  
The caller also informed the police that the two men had left Ocean 
City to go to Philadelphia to purchase the drugs and that they would 
return that same day via Atlantic City.53
 45 Id. at 46–47, 853 A.2d at 907. 
 46 Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 28, 853 A.2d at 896. 
 47 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Demeter, 124 N.J. 374, 385, 590 
A.2d 1179, 1185 (1991)). 
 48 Id. 
 49 172 N.J. 117, 796 A.2d 857 (2002). 
 50 178 N.J. 205, 837 A.2d 359 (2003). 
 51 Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 121, 796 A.2d at 859. 
 52 Id. at 121–22, 796 A.2d at 859. 
 53 Id. at 122, 796 A.2d at 859. 
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After observing two men matching the description exit a bus in 
Atlantic City, the officers quickly sought to detain them.54  The 
officers asked the men if they would agree to speak with them and 
accompany them to the bus terminal patrol office.55  Once inside that 
office, the police separated the two men, inquiring of each man 
whether he had anything on him that he “shouldn’t have.”56  The 
defendant signed a consent to search form, resulting in a search of 
his person and bag that yielded heroin.57
After concluding that a field inquiry of the defendant had 
escalated into an investigative detention, the court considered 
whether the police had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing to justify that conduct.58  The court held that the officers 
did not.59  The court first noted that, because the police asked no 
questions of the defendant before taking him to the patrol office and 
had observed nothing unusual about him, the only possible basis on 
which to justify the stop was the information imparted by the 
anonymous informant.60  The court concluded that without greater 
corroboration of the tip’s content, the tip standing alone could not 
justify an investigatory detention.61  The court explained: 
The informant accurately described the appearance of [the] 
defendant and [his companion], and correctly predicted their 
location at the bus terminal.  We cannot reasonably conclude, 
based on those benign elements of the informant’s tip, that the 
tip itself was “reliable in its assertion of illegality[.]”  In respect of 
that aspect of the tip most critical to the analysis, namely, that 
[the] defendant would be engaged in drug trafficking, the 
informant provided no explanation of how or why he arrived at 
that conclusion.  In fact, the only portion of the tip corroborated 
by the officers pertained to the innocent details of [the] 
defendant’s appearance at the bus terminal.62
The court suppressed the fruits of the search even though the 
defendant ultimately had consented to it.63  Therefore, beyond 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 123, 796 A.2d at 860. 
 57 Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 124, 796 A.2d at 860. 
 58 Id. at 129, 796 A.2d at 864. 
 59 Id. at 131, 796 A.2d at 865. 
 60 Id. at 132–33, 796 A.2d at 865–66. 
 61 Id. at 133, 796 A.2d at at 866. 
 62 Id. at 131, 796 A.2d at 865 (third alteration in original) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 63 Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 133, 796 A.2d at 866. 
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serving as an example of the reasonable suspicion standard, Rodriguez 
demonstrates how the court will invalidate a suspect’s consent when it 
finds that a constitutional violation has occurred earlier in the chain 
of events.  Compare that result to the one obtained in Golotta.64
In Golotta,65 an anonymous 9-1-1 caller gave a description of a 
motor vehicle that the caller indicated was being driven erratically on 
a public road.66  The 9-1-1 dispatcher relayed the information to two 
officers who spotted the vehicle and immediately pulled it over 
without independently observing whether it “was all over the road” or 
“out of control” as described by the anonymous caller.67  
Notwithstanding that lack of corroboration, the court upheld the 
stop of the vehicle.68
The court distinguished Rodriguez by noting that in Rodriguez 
there was no immediate safety risk either to the public or to the 
officers.69  In contrast, the purpose of the stop in Golotta “was to 
protect [the] defendant and the public from a threat of death or 
serious injury occasioned by [the] defendant’s suspected condition 
[of being an intoxicated driver].”70
The court also explained that a 9-1-1 call, by its nature, “carries a 
fair degree of reliability,”71 and that the information imparted to the 
officers had “an unmistakable sense that the caller ha[d] witnessed 
an ongoing offense that implicate[d] a risk of imminent death or 
serious injury. . . .”72  Moreover, the caller disclosed a sufficient 
quantity of information about the suspected vehicle, including its 
license plate number, “to permit the officers reasonably to conclude 
that [the] defendant’s truck was, in fact, the suspected vehicle.”73
The lessons learned from Pineiro, Moore, Rodriguez, and Golotta is 
that individual facts matter very much in the search-and-seizure 
context, that the trial court should painstakingly review such facts 
when evaluating the challenged conduct, and that an appellate court 
often will rely on subtle differences in fact patterns when conducting 
its own review of a suppression motion.  Above all, trial courts should 
 64 See infra notes 68–73 and accompanying text. 
 65 178 N.J. 205, 837 A.2d 359 (2003). 
 66 Id. at 209, 837 A.2d at 361. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 218, 837 A.2d at 366. 
 69 Id. at 227, 837 A.2d at 372; see supra notes 51–62 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of Rodriguez. 
 70 Id. at 228, 837 A.2d at 372. 
 71 Golotta, 178 N.J. at 219, 837 A.2d at 367. 
 72 Id. at 221–22, 837 A.2d at 369. 
 73 Id. at 223, 837 A.2d at 370. 
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state their reasoning clearly and should describe with specificity the 
relevant factual findings justifying their decisions. 
Before running down the list of recent holdings, the last 
conceptual point that I would like to note is that my former court has 
continued its tradition of departing from federal law under 
appropriate circumstances.  Both the majority and dissenting 
opinions in Joye v. Hunterdon Central Regional High School Board of 
Education,74 the high school drug-testing case, provide a succinct 
catalogue of instances in which the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
interpreted the State constitution as affording its citizens greater 
protections than those established by its federal counterpart. 
Those, then, are some of the broad concepts reflected in the last 
five years of case law.  Given the fact-sensitive nature of our case law, 
no discussion is complete without at least a brief rundown of the 
court’s actual holdings (some of which I already have described).  I 
now focus on the major cases decided since November 2003. 
The court decided State v. Golotta in December 2003.  As I 
mentioned earlier, the Golotta court sustained the stop of a vehicle 
based on information imparted by an anonymous 9-1-1 caller.75  The 
case is interesting from a number of perspectives.  Aside from its 
narrow holding, the court did not permit the Attorney General 
belatedly to submit the fact that the caller was, in reality, not 
anonymous because a record of the name was contained in a written 
abstract generated by the 9-1-1 dispatch system.76  That fact was never 
brought out at the suppression hearing conducted two years earlier.77  
The court agreed with the defendant that the State should not be 
permitted to “re-write the trial record” so long after the motion judge 
had made his findings.78
The court did, however, use some of the generic information 
about the 9-1-1 system that was included in the Attorney General’s 
supplemental filing.79  That permitted the court to describe in greater 
detail in its opinion the 9-1-1 system statewide.  It also is interesting to 
note that Golotta was cited not too long ago by the Hawaii Supreme 
 74 176 N.J. 568, 607, 826 A.2d 624, 648 (2003) (noting distinctions between the 
protections provided by the United States Constitution and the New Jersey 
Constitution); id. at 636–38, 826 A.2d at 665–66 (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) (same). 
 75 178 N.J. at 209, 837 A.2d at 361. 
 76 Id. at 211, 837 A.2d at 362. 
 77 Id. at 211–12, 837 A.2d at 362. 
 78 Id. at 211, 837 A.2d at 362. 
 79 Id. at 212, 837 A.2d at 363. 
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Court,80 a reminder that New Jersey’s jurisprudence is often cited 
beyond its borders. 
A few months after Golotta, in March 2004, the court decided 
State v. Cassidy.81  In that case, the court considered the emergency 
aid exception to the warrant requirement and held that the 
exception did not excuse a search by police of the defendant’s 
residence that had been conducted pursuant to an invalid warrant.82  
The case also is significant for its succinct summary of the exigency 
doctrine.83  Further, the court’s opinion is noteworthy for its 
description of the interplay between exigency and emergency aid, as 
well as the interplay between those two doctrines and the Prevention 
of Domestic Violence Act,84 which provided the backdrop to the 
appeal.85
State v. Jones86 and State v. Sanchez,87 both decided in April 2004, 
continued the court’s jurisprudence in the area of no-knock warrants.  
The court reaffirmed the three-part test articulated three years earlier 
in State v. Johnson.88  Jones is significant because it addressed an issue 
left open in Johnson, namely, the sufficiency and relevance of a 
suspect’s criminal history in establishing a reasonable suspicion of 
danger to an officer’s safety, one of the grounds for sustaining a no-
knock warrant.89  The court held that the defendant’s seven-year-old 
arrest for assault against a police officer and a weapons-related crime 
were sufficient for that purpose.90
Jones also addressed whether the warrant was based on sufficient 
probable cause.  Upholding the warrant on that basis, the court 
repeated an observation made in a prior case, State v. Sullivan,91 “that 
a controlled drug buy, by itself, would not conclusively establish 
probable cause.”92  The Jones court hastened to add, however, that the 
observation in Sullivan “was not intended to suggest that a controlled 
 80 See State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 722 (Haw. 2004) (denying defendant’s 
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an anonymous tip). 
 81 179 N.J. 150, 843 A.2d 1132 (2004). 
 82 Id. at 162, 843 A.2d at 1139. 
 83 Id. at 160, 843 A.2d at 1137. 
 84 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:25-17 (West 1991). 
 85 Cassidy, 179 N.J. at 162–65, 843 A.2d at 1138–40. 
 86 179 N.J. 377, 846 A.2d 569 (2004). 
 87 179 N.J. 409, 846 A.2d 588 (2004). 
 88 168 N.J. 608, 775 A.2d 1273 (2001). 
 89 Jones, 179 N.J. at 399, 846 A.2d at 581 (citing State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 216, 
777 A.2d 60, 67 (2001)). 
 90 Id. at 401–02, 846 A.2d at 583. 
 91 169 N.J. 204, 777 A.2d 60 (2001). 
 92 Jones, 179 N.J. at 392, 846 A.2d at 577. 
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drug purchase is an inconsequential factor.”93  The court went on to 
state that “even one additional circumstance might suffice, in the 
totality of the circumstances, to demonstrate probable cause when 
the police successfully have performed a controlled drug buy.”94
In Sanchez, only the no-knock aspect of the warrant was at issue.  
As in Jones, the court concluded that within the totality of 
circumstances the defendant’s criminal history provided a sufficient 
basis for the no-knock entry into his apartment.95  That history 
included an arrest for aggravated assault and unlawful possession of a 
weapon.96
The 9-1-1 system again was at the center of a search-and-seizure 
case in State v. Frankel,97 decided in May 2004.  In that case, a local 
police department received an open-line 9-1-1 call from the 
defendant’s home address.98  The department dispatched an officer 
to the home where the defendant greeted him.99  The defendant 
“advised the officer that he lived alone, did not make and could not 
account for the call, and would not consent to a search of his home 
so that the officer could satisfy himself that no one was in need of 
assistance.”100  As he spoke to the officer, defendant was positioned 
behind a white sheet that was hanging behind the screen door, which 
blocked “any view through the door or side windows.”101
According to the officer’s testimony, the defendant “appeared 
both surprised and nervous by the officer’s presence.”102  The 
dispatcher informed the officer that he (the dispatcher) dialed back 
the defendant’s telephone number only to receive a busy signal.103  
According to the court’s opinion, that “information confirmed in 
[the officer’s] mind that there might be ‘somebody inside the 
house.’”104
The officer ultimately entered the home, discovering illegal 
drugs in plain view.105  The court upheld the resulting seizure of 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 State v. Sanchez, 179 N.J. 409, 412, 846 A.2d 588, 589 (2004). 
 96 Id. at 411, 846 A.2d at 589. 
 97 179 N.J. 586, 847 A.2d 561 (2004). 
 98 Id. at 592, 847 A.2d at 564. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. at 593, 847 A.2d at 565. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Frankel, 179 N.J. at 594–95, 847 A.2d at 566. 
 104 Id. at 595, 847 A.2d at 566. 
 105 Id. at 595–96, 847 A.2d at 566. 
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contraband.106  Citing the totality of circumstances and the 
emergency aid doctrine, the court explained: 
This is a close case and the unique facts that justified the 
warrantless search of [the] defendant’s home should not be over 
read. . . .  The privacy interests of the home are entitled to the 
highest degree of respect and protection within our constitutional 
framework.  But there are limited exceptions to the warrant 
requirement when the duty to preserve and protect life and the 
need to act decisively and promptly must outweigh the privacy 
interests of an individual.  This case presents one such example.107
Safety likewise was the theme in State v. Diloreto,108 decided in 
June 2004.  In that case, a police officer ran a check of the 
defendant’s car license plate number using a mobile data terminal 
and discovered that the defendant was listed under the NCIC109 
system as an endangered missing person.110  In reality, that listing was 
in error, although the officer at that juncture was unaware of that 
fact.111  When the officer first discovered the car it appeared to be 
running, its windows were fogged, and the defendant appeared to be 
asleep.112
The vehicle itself was parked at a hotel facing U.S. Highway 46.113  
The officer knew of reports from that location of automobile thefts 
and attempted suicides.  According to the court’s opinion, “[a]fter 
receiving the NCIC alert, the officer called for assistance.  He also 
noticed that the tailpipe of the parked vehicle was no longer emitting 
fumes and concluded ‘[t]hat the engine had been shut off.’”  
Additionally, the court observed that “[the d]efendant produced a 
driver’s license and social security card, which matched the name of 
the missing person.”114
A second officer arrived.115  While the two officers awaited 
confirmation of the defendant’s status from their police 
headquarters, they decided to place the defendant in the police 
 106 Id. at 610–11, 847 A.2d at 575. 
 107 Id. at 611–12, 847 A.2d at 576 (internal citations omitted). 
 108 180 N.J. 264, 850 A.2d 1226 (2004). 
 109 According to the court, the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC") 
“houses a national network of information authorized by Congress and made 
available to federal and local criminal justice agencies.”  Id. at 269, 850 A.2d at 1229. 
 110 Diloreto, 180 N.J. at 269, 850 A.2d at 1229. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 270, 850 A.2d at 1229. 
 114 Id. at 271, 850 A.2d at 1230. 
 115 Id. 
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vehicle.116  “At that time, it was raining.”117  One of the officers 
explained, “it was simply a welfare check” and that they decided “to 
put him in the rear of the squad car . . . for reasons of officer safety as 
well as safety to the individual.”118
Before placing the defendant into the squad car, one of the 
officers patted down the defendant’s front pocket and felt a large 
metal object.119  At first the defendant said that he did not know what 
that object was but as the officer began to remove it, the defendant 
identified it as “‘a clip.’  The officer understood that response to 
mean ‘an ammunition magazine for a handgun or any type of 
ammunition magazine.’”120  In response to a request by one of the 
officers, the defendant revealed “the location of the gun that was 
associated with the ammunition clip.”121  He indicated that the gun 
could be found under the car’s front seat.122  The officers retrieved 
the weapon from that location and transported the defendant to 
police headquarters.123  They then discovered that the gun was used 
in a robbery and murder at a gas station and that the NCIC report 
had been maintained in the computer system in error.124
Invoking the community caretaker doctrine, the court held that 
the totality of circumstances justified the sequence of events.125  It 
indicated that several factors triggered the officers’ community 
caretaking role, the most important of which was the fact “that the 
officers believed [the] defendant to be an endangered missing 
person contained in an NCIC alert.”126  The court also stated that it 
was “convinced that the officers did not perform the community 
caretaker function as a pretext for a criminal investigation.”127  
Completing the analysis, the court explained that “[i]n addition to 
harboring safety concerns as caretakers, the police lawfully 
accumulated information to meet the probable cause and exigency 
standards before searching [the] defendant’s car.”128
 116 Diloreto, 180 N.J. at 272, 850 A.2d at 1231. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 273, 850 A.2d at 1231. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id., 850 A.2d at 1232. 
 122 Diloreto, 180 N.J. at 273, 850 A.2d at 1232. 
 123 Id. at 273–74, 850 A.2d at 1232. 
 124 Id. at 274, 850 A.2d at 1232. 
 125 Id. at 277, 850 A.2d at 1234. 
 126 Id. at 278, 850 A.2d at 1235. 
 127 Id. at 280, 850 A.2d at 1236. 
 128 Diloreto, 180 N.J. at 282, 850 A.2d at 1237. 
VERNIERO FINAL.DOC 10/9/2005  8:59:05 AM 
58 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:45 
 
I already have discussed the last two search-and-seizure cases 
decided in the 2003-2004 term of the court, State v. Pineiro129 and State 
v. Moore.130
Allow me to end as I began: the jurisprudence of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in the search-and-seizure area is highly fact-sensitive.  
When appropriate, the court has set forth standards to guide trial 
courts and, presumably, to achieve some sense of uniformity in the 
case law.  Placing those decisions alongside existing decisions in the 
overall mosaic of law is both challenging and intellectually rewarding.  
And important constitutional rights always are at stake. 
 
 129 181 N.J. 13, 853 A.2d 887 (2004). 
 130 181 N.J. 40, 853 A.2d 903 (2004). 
